Loading ...The puzzle of the Palestinian government
The formation of the Palestinian government has become a quiz show like those aired on Arab TV stations in Ramadan. The story began after the formation of a government that could not take off due to its internal differences, due to the presence of a parallel government in the Gaza Strip, and because any government under the occupation and suffering unfair restrictions that stemmed from the Oslo agreement could not be in control. Thus governance remains in the hands of the Israeli occupation, leaving the rest of the “administrative and service affairs” to be decided by the president of the Palestinian Authority and not the government, which is merely a front.
Instead of facing the truth and addressing the causes that prevent the success of the government, Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah called for ministerial changes to remove those who do not get on with him. These people, he claimed on television, were forced on him. This time he wants to add ministers he gets along with, but President Mahmoud Abbas asked him to wait until the picture becomes clearer after the Israeli elections, and to see if there will be any political activity to revive the so-called peace process. In addition, any cabinet reshuffle will require Hamas’s agreement.
We’ve witnessed new chapters in the story, which included ministerial trips to prove the government’s presence in the Gaza Strip. They ended by restricting the ministers’ movement because of the dispute over the salaries of public employees who don’t go to work (as instructed by Fatah) and others employed by Hamas as the elected government post-2006. The issue led to the resignation of the deputy prime minister who is also the minister of the economy, while the second deputy PM missed a number of meetings without resigning after all his attempts to reconcile the government and the parallel government failed. The story reached its peak with an argument between the prime minister and the minister of education who left the meeting but announced that she will remain in the government.
Then the president announced in the Revolutionary Council meeting that the government will resign within twenty-four hours, and his adviser duly announced the resignation of Hamdallah’s government the next day, and that Abbas had asked him to form another one. This was followed by the official spokesman of the president denying the resignation of the government and announcing that the whole issue has been referred to the PLO Executive Committee to decide. However, who is that committee to decide on a matter that is so important, when it is usually the last to know about such things and carries on with its acclaimed role of either approving or remaining neutral about decisions made by the president?
In the light of the above, there are several possible scenarios for the formation of the next Palestinian government. The government could continue in its current form, for example, but with ministerial changes to suit Hamdallah and the addition of some new ministers so that some do not have more than one portfolio. This is feasible because the current government is still in office and has clearly not resigned.
The obstacle that stands in the way of this is that it needs the approval of Hamas, because if there is any government reform without the movement’s approval then we will go back to square one; Hamas will form its own government or a national body to rule the Gaza Strip. This would pave the way for the division to turn into de facto separation and the establishment of a mini-state in Gaza; it could also enhance the possibility of reaching a long-term truce and security deal with Israel in return for lifting the blockade. Hamas’s approval remains possible, though, if it is offered something like salaries for its employees and integrating them into a functional structure of the PA.
The second scenario is the formation of a government that is made up of the PLO plus some independent figures, which means that Fatah will have a bigger role. The government could then play a bigger political role in, for example, negotiations, if they resume, especially because Hamdallah has shown flexibility over the conditions for this to happen.
However, the PFLP and perhaps the DFLP and the People’s Party will not participate in such a government, because they have called for the formation of a national unity government. If they do not take part, the government will lose its political cover, which will cause a dispute between the factions within the PLO and isolate Fatah (which will look like it’s on the side of factions that have no real representation). This scenario also means deepening the division and, again, bringing it back to square one.
The third scenario is the formation of a strong national unity government; if it is headed by the president, so much the better. Such a government will be more capable than the others in terms of manoeuvrability and changing course completely rather than simply patching matters up. It will also be able to deal with external and internal challenges and threats, employing opportunities and reducing losses and damage, in addition to blocking the establishment of a mini state in Gaza and a temporary state in the West Bank. However, such a unity government has to commit to the conditions of the Middle East Quartet. Abbas told French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius that it will only include parties which recognise Israel, renounce violence and agree to the Quartet conditions; thus, it will not include Hamas and, in addition, the government will be the president’s, in the sense that its programme is his.
Nevertheless, Fabius revealed that President Abbas told him that he would try to form a national unity government, so the issue of relations with this government can be up for discussion. Basically, if the factions agree to the conditions of the Quartet, there will be a government of national unity, otherwise there won’t.
At first glance, the president’s argument seems strong, as a government that does not comply with the obligations of Oslo will expose it to an international and US, and perhaps European, boycott, as well as Israeli sanctions and aggression. This, though, is an argument that collapses in the face of the fragmentation and gradual collapse facing the PA if it continues to be part of the circle of evil obligations. Proof that the authority no longer has any power is the way that the occupation authorities deal with permits given to Palestinians; the PA is apparently a secondary agent which knows nothing and cannot oppose what is decided for it.
Mahmoud Abbas has a very good argument that he can use to defend the formation of a national unity government if he wants to, which is that Israel agreed prisoner exchange deals and ceasefire agreements with Hamas, and that there have been ongoing negotiations between the movement and Israel – albeit indirectly through a third party – regarding a long term truce in exchange for lifting the blockade. This means that Hamas is negotiating with Israel, so we don’t have to give in to Israeli demands of not allowing Hamas to be in the government since the Palestinian national interest requires the movement to be involved. The international community, the US and Europe will not be able to boycott such a unity government (including Hamas) for long because if they do so, they will be boycotting all Palestinians and taking the region into the unknown.
To minimise reactions, the government’s programme should include the use of international law and UN resolutions as reference points, in addition to the preservation of national rights.
This national unity government can be a government for the Palestinian state which the world has recognised. It can help to end the division if it comes as a step in the context of the comprehensive application of the Cairo Agreement, where there will be only one party speaking for Palestinians. This will strengthen them on all levels, especially where there is confrontation or negotiation.
The formation of a national unity government is difficult because it threatens groups that have interests in continuing the division and whose interests have grown with more influence and wealth. It also affects relations between Palestinian parties and Arab, regional and international parties, axes and groups. It will threaten individual control over various components of the Palestinian political system in light of the absence of all institutions of the PA and the PLO, and the loss of their legitimacy as their election mandate has expired. They have also failed to adopt resistance and reconciliation as a basis for partnership and renewal of other institutions in the PLO until elections are held.
Source: www.middleeastmonitor.com