How will Israel’s War with Lebanon’s Hezbollah Evolve?
By: Ghassan Rubeiz / Arab America Contributing Writer
Will the ongoing exchange of fire between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah escalate further into an all-out war? The outcome depends on several local and global factors. The war in Gaza may end soon, or it may drag on. Israel will likely have a new government soon. Iran’s newly elected president may open up channels of diplomacy. Lebanon may elect a new president. Finally, the US November elections might bring a new set of advisors to the White House advocating new foreign policy features.
In a recent webinar at the Arab Center Washington, Paul Salem, Vice President for International Relations of Middle East Institute, asserted that Israel was unlikely to wage an all-out war on Lebanon this summer, for lack of military readiness. According to Salem, Israel will have to improve its air defense system, end the war in Gaza, and become fully mobilized militarily before it attacks a well-prepared and armed Hezbollah. Salem does expect Israel to launch a full-blown attack on the Lebanese resistance forces next year, or even in 2026.
The current Israeli government is under increasing pressure to secure the return of evacuees from its northern border with Lebanon, as well as the release of its hostages held by Hamas. The invitation of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to speak to a joint session of the US Congress may extend the life of Israel’s overstressed cabinet. Netanyahu expects to gain credibility during his Washington visit. He will try to gain the support of the White House for such a newly expanded war. He will also try to secure a promise from President Biden to back Israel if Iran gets involved. Netanyahu may not receive US full support for such an escalation, given his nihilistic attack on Gaza, much of which was carried out against US wishes. If Israel elects a new cabinet soon, it may not reflexively embark on a new and risky war.
Israel and Hezbollah have been negotiating through US and European channels for months, but one is a state and one is not. Meanwhile, the Lebanese parliament has failed to elect a president for nearly 20 months. The longer this power vacuum persists, the more factions like Hezbollah feel free to make major national decisions which are normally the province of the state. Hezbollah is gaining political strength as it becomes the major defender of the country, instead of the national armed forces. For some observers, it is not if, but when, Israel will attack Lebanon. But Israel does not have the forces to stay fully mobilized for a long war, while a regionally supported Hezbollah seems to be determined to resist Israel as long as the conflict in Gaza continues.
Iran is a major factor as well. The leadership of recently elected President Masoud Pezeshkian has not been tested, and Western observers may be underestimating his charisma. He may find ways to mend relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. He may also be able to revive nuclear negotiations with the West. A thaw between Sunnis and Shiites would unite the Muslim world in the Middle East against foreign intervention, strengthen the Palestinian cause, and ease tensions between the Sunni and Shiite communities in Lebanon. Arab Gulf states’ suspicion of Iran drives them to seek security from Washington and Israel. A breakthrough in relations between Tehran and the Arab Gulf states would help the Lebanese unite across sectarian lines. Israel would be unlikely to attack Lebanon and continue to crush Palestinians in the face of an alliance between Riadh and Tehran.
Netanyahu expects Trump if elected, to offer him carte blanche on Palestine and Lebanon, and it is likely that a Trump administration would offer Israel a wider margin of freedom to attack Lebanon. On the other hand, if Biden stays in the White House for a second term, he may gain the courage to do what his conscience dictates, rather than pander to the Israeli lobby in hopes of their support. US bipartisan support for Israel will not change significantly with a new presidential election. However, a 2025 US administration of either party might pay serious attention to Iran’s likely diplomatic overtures. A new US administration might also realize the implications of the growing erosion of Arab states’ trust in Washington. There are too many moving parts in the political situation to make safe predictions about Israel’s future conduct in Gaza and its relation with Lebanon.
Ghassan Rubeiz is the former Middle East Secretary of the World Council of Churches. Earlier he taught psychology and social work in his country of birth, Lebanon, and later in the United States, where he currently lives. For the past twenty years, he has contributed to political commentary and delivered occasional public talks on subjects related to peace, justice, and interfaith. You can reach him at rubeizg@gmail.com
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab America. The reproduction of this article is permissible with proper credit to Arab America and the author.
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